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The Many Faces of Science and Technology Relationships
Abstract
In this paper, the different theories about science and technology relationships are analyzed. All of them
have some virtues, but also one main defect: these theories do not take into account other well-founded
possible relationships. The origin of this problem is the narrow view about science and technology. In
this paper another characterization about technology based on Ronald Giere’s perspective is suggested. In
the light of this new description, six different relationships between science and technology arise. Some
of these relations had been explained in the before analyzed theories, but others emerge from the new
portrayal.
0. Introduction.
One of the most popular problems in the area of philosophy of technology is the characterization of
science?technology relationships. Various models try to explain these relations from different points of
view. Some of these descriptions talk about either an application from scientific knowledge to
technological innovation, or from new technological artifacts to new scientific discoveries. This
application model was once a largely widespread opinion among historians and philosophers, but
criticisms from economics, sociology and history have exposed good reasons for reconsideration. The
critics have given rise to new interpretations and models, which extend from those which consider
science and technology to be two different systems, to others that uphold that there are no significant
differences between science and technology.
The first task of this paper is to show a brief review of the different models which have tried to
explain the science-technology relationships. Section 1 looks at hierarchical models—in both
directions, from science to technology, and from technology to science. Section 2 takes up non-
hierarchical models. Section 3 suggests a reconsideration about the characteristics of science and
technology in the light of Ronald Giere’s perspective. This new explanation has the distinct merit of
allowing a wider comprehension of the possible science- technology relations. At the end of this
section, a general outline about the six different identified relationships is propounded.
1. The hierarchical model.
In this section it is possible to characterize two versions of the same idea: there is a relationship of
subordination between science and technology. Without some developments in one area there is no
possibility for the other to develop. There are two different versions: one maintains that technology
is the outcome of the application of new scientific knowledge. The other one holds that without a
special technological infrastructure there is no new scientific knowledge. In this first section, both
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linear models (and their critics) are discussed.
1. 1. Technology as the application of basic scientific knowledge.
This idea has been maintained by both scientists and engineers. The famous report of Vannevar
Bush (an engineer in the Manhattan Project) came to the conclusion that basic research leads to new
knowledge, and this creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be
drawn (Bush, 1945, p. 13). Without basic research there is no possibility of technological progress.
This linear or hierarchical model has its roots in economic and prestige factors. Scientists, for fear
of technological outcomes over?shadowing scientific research, wanted to establish a linear
dependence between scientific discoveries and technological innovation. On the other hand,
engineers were happy to obtain status: the reputation of applied scientist was better than technician.
The most sophisticated version of this thesis in philosophy was produced by Mario Bunge (Bunge,
1966). Bunge defined technology as applied science: “The method and the theories of science can
be applied either to increasing our knowledge of the external and the internal reality or to enhancing
our welfare and power. If the goal is purely cognitive, pure science is obtained; if primarily
practical, applied science” (Bunge, 1966, p. 329). There are two ways for applying science to
produce technology: (i) in substantive theories, which are applications of scientific theories to
nearly real situations—for example, the theory of flight as an application of fluid dynamics. The
other possibility is (ii) in operative technological theories, which apply the scientific method. The
primary objective of technology here is to establish “stable norms of successful human behavior,
that is, rules” (Bunge, 1966, p. 338). These rules ought to be based on scientific laws to warrant
their efficiency. A law, a nomological statement, is translated into a nomopragmatic statement,
which provides the basis for a pair of rules. These rules prescribe a course of action and indicate
“how one should proceed in order to achieve a predetermined goal” (Bunge, 1966, p. 338).
There were many critics in economics, sociology, history and philosophy, opposed to these ideas.
The first reactions against the linear model were published in the late 60's and early 70's in two
studies initiated with the aim of showing the economic benefits of scientific research: TRACES
(produced by the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, 1968); and Hindsight (see
Isenson, 1969), and both concluded that “we cannot see that it is possible in any systematic way to
trace important industrial applications of science back to basic work of the kind that the Research
Councils support in a way which could help in determining how much support is justified” (see
Gibbons and Johnston, 1974, p. 220). These two studies had in common one methodological
assumption: that “innovation could be considered as composed of a series of specifiable events in
research and development”, so that “the contribution of science to technology could be assessed by
tracing the origin of these events” (Gibbons and Johnston, 1974, p. 222). However, they concluded
that the transfer from new knowledge to new artifacts is an extremely complex process; the
relationship between the academy and industrial research is not obvious nor direct, and innovation
demands knowledge from internal and external sources. Similar studies to those produced by
Michael Gibbons and C. Johnston were published by W. Faulkner, J. Senker, and L. Velho (1995).
The conclusions were similar: the great majority of knowledge used in innovation originates within
technological sources and is associated with design and R&D activities. The main external source
comes from the public sector.
These economic studies proved, on the one hand, that the relationship between science and
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technology is different from direct application, and on the other, that technological knowledge plays
a more important role in technological development than scientific discoveries. Researches carried
out within industry account for technological innovation more effectively than remote scientific
theories.
Along with these economic and sociological criticisms came historical criticisms. Derek S. Price in
(1965) suggested one of the first historical reactions against the idea of technology as applied
science. In this article he carried out a bibliometric study of science and technology, analyzing the
differences in technological and scientific literature, “paying attention to the way in which the
papers and the men related to each other, the journals in which the papers are published, and several
indicators of the quality and scientific importance of papers, men, and journal” (Price, 1965, p.
555). If technology and science have the hierarchical relationship, their references should be related,
too. Nevertheless, Price concluded that “the greater part of technology. . . does not seem to have
such strong links with any particular portion of scientific literature” (Price, 1965, p. 563).
Other historical criticisms explored the reasons for the spread of the linear model among scientists
and technologists. Edwin T. Layton (1976a) describes three ideologies about the science?technology
relationships that arose during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the United States. Nathan
Rosenberg and Richard Nelson (1994) focus on the real relations between academic and industrial
fields from the seventeenth to the twentieth century in North America. Finally, Ronald Kline (1995)
analyzes how, between 1880 and 1945, significant engineers and scientists proclaimed the
relationship in conferences and articles. In a nutshell, both Layton and Rosenberg, Nelson and Kline
concluded that the alleged reasons were spurious rather than epistemological ones. Scientists, for
instance, were worried about the increasing prestige of technological innovation and tried to recover
an earlier level of capital investment in their areas. Thus, if we want technological innovation, they
argued, it is necessary to develop new basic (or “pure”) scientific research.
Another argument was raised from history, this time concerned with some technological
developments, which happened to have no scientific explanation. The best known case is that of the
steam engine and the laws of thermodynamics. The scientist Sadi Carnot set out to explain the
behavior of a very efficient machine that had been created more or less half a century earlier by an
engineer: James Watt. These sorts of examples are incompatible with the linear model: a scientific
explanation came after and not before technological innovation. Which scientific theories were
technologists applying in such cases?
Other kinds of criticisms came from the field of philosophy. The most important problem is the
characterization of the application process. There is no explanation about how a new scientific
discovery is transformed into a new technological device. It is, in fact, very difficult to explain how
an idealized scientific law can be used in a specific technological situation (see Christine Shrader-
Frechette, 1989). Scientific laws are idealized because they have to explain the phenomena in a
generalized way, and these laws must be applicable to many different situations. However, these
laws, when applied to real situations, give rise to errors: “The greater the inaccuracy of the
idealization, the less desirable a particular application” (Shrader-Frechette, 1989, p. 348). If the
application of a scientific law to a technological situation is so difficult, how could we, in general,
use science to obtain new technology?
Despite the weakness of the linear model, it remains a very popular idea, and scientists and
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engineers still believe in it today. It is difficult to overcome such a widespread proposal, and that is
a good reason to reconsider its weak points—and alternatives.
1. 2. Technology creates new scientific possibilities.
The hierarchical model also moves in another direction, one from technological innovation to
scientific discoveries. For instance, Derek de Solla Price (1984) argues that there are some
technological innovations (arising within normal technological evolution) that yield new scientific
possibilities. Price gives as an example the development of the telescope by Galileo. Galileo was
able to change the cosmology of his time thanks to telescopic observations. This new instrument led
to the acquisition of new data, which made possible new scientific knowledge. Such relationships
between science and technology occur in the field of experimentation. There is not a path from
science to technology, through applied science; instead, basic and applied research are linked to
technology by instrumentality. “Thus, the dominant pattern of science/technology interaction turns
out to be that both the scientific and the technological innovation may proceed from the same
adventitious invention of a new instrumentality. In science the typical result of such a major change
is a breakthrough or shift of paradigm. In technology one has a significant innovation and the
possibility of products that were not around to be sold last year” (Price, 1984, p. 15). Nowadays,
research laboratories are trying to bring to light new techniques which reproduce this same
phenomena of instrumentality.
In the same vein is the theory of Joseph Pitt (1995, 2000), who enlarges the ideas of Price about the
direction of development of science and technology. Instead of instrumentalities, Pitt expounds the
concept of infrastructure, something more complex than the habitual meaning of technology. A
technological infrastructure is “a complex set of mutually supporting individuals, artifacts,
networks, and structures, physical and social, which enable human activity and which foster inquiry
and action” (Pitt, 1998. See too: Pitt 2000, p. 24). Science is one of the components of a
technological infrastructure, but without other activities science would be impossible. Scientific
change is the outcome of changes in the technological infrastructure where scientific explanation is
generated. Every development in scientific knowledge must be explained in terms of a specific
historical context—to be exact, in terms of a technological infrastructure.
Both Price and Pitt come to the conclusion that some kind of technology (an instrumentality for
Price, an infrastructure for Pitt) is necessary to make possible a scientific development, and changes
in these technologies are responsible for new science. The relationship between science and
technology is not a matter of subordination, going from technology to science any more than from
science to technology. However, it is worth remarking that there are some technological devices
that would not have been possible if some scientific investigations had not been done before.
Another important problem is related to the role of technological knowledge in scientific
development. In the interpretation of the science?technology relationship of Price and Pitt,
technology is always an artifact or a set of artifacts, in which technology gives rise to some kinds of
knowledge that could be an influence on scientific development. This is to say that, this version of
the hierarchical model, no more than the other one, is not complex enough to explain the entirety of
science?technology relationships.
2. Non-hierarchical models.
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2. 1. Technology and science as different and separate systems.
Some philosophers and historians try to provide a more accurate explanation of these relationships,
avoiding any kind of subordination while explaining the complex features of science and
technology. Their theories can be seen as reactions against the hierarchical model, but are more than
this. These authors wanted to go beyond, to look for a new characterization of technology, such as
Edwin Layton’s “mirror-image twins” (1971). Science and technology are very similar
communities, but with differences. Each of them has its own goals, languages, values and social
controls. Engineers place “doing” in front of “knowing,” a very important condition for values,
languages and knowledge structures. Between these two communities there are a variety of
relationships: they are like two different organisms which “live together in a mutually beneficial
relationship.” Therefore, even though technology and science are independent, they are still related.
The problem with this conception is that it does not explain where and how the relationships
between scientists and engineers take place. If science and technology are so different it is difficult
to imagine which the terms of this relation are. Which kinds of scientists are connected with
engineers? Which kinds of engineers are in this relation? Moreover, science can be interpreted both
as research activities or as a set of theories, laws and methodologies; that is, as a process or as a
result. Likewise, the same can be said for technology, which is both a set of technological devices
and the complex process for producing them – again, a process or a result. The relationships in the
conception of technology and science as different and separated systems do not mention any of
these distinctions. Without them it is difficult to understand the kinds of relationships that exist
between science and technology. To say that the relation is symbiotic is not to say much that is
specific.
2. 2. The absence of differences: the continuum model.
While preceding proposals share the consideration about science and technology as two different
and distinguishable areas, constructivists propose the idea that it is not possible to distinguish
between them1 . Regarding the constructivists model, science and technology are not separate
communities, but a single entity, named the “science?technology complex,” or “technoscience.”
Whether in former times science and technology were able to develop separately, after the Industrial
Revolution they merged into a single complex.2
There are some differences between all the perspectives comprised under the name of
constructivism. The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach, as well as the work of
Collins and Woolgar, maintain the “symmetry principle”, avoiding any explanation of real features
of technology (see, for instance, Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987, p. 17). Technology is a social
construction and can be only explained by reference to the social elements (actors and social
groups) that have produced its stabilization. The “social shaping” approach (see, for instance,
MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985, or MacKenzie, 1990) distinguishes between different categories:
natural, social, and technical. The authors who belong to this group are interested in how social
factors shape technology. Nevertheless, these sociologists recognize the role of nonsocial factors in
technological change, and are less reluctant to accept that technology has properties and effects,
even though the properties and effects are relative to a particular social context. Finally, there is
another group of researchers interested in science and technology problems: those in the actor-
3
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network theory  , who claim that technological and scientific objects are consequences of the work
of actor networks (not only human actors, but also natural and technical phenomena).
The thesis of a single and indistinguishable science and technology complex is fostered by some
sociologists as Pinch. When these sociologists try to understand technological problems they prefer
to consider technology to be similar to science. From this view, the desire to distinguish science
from technology is due to an idealized perspective on science. Since actual science is very similar
to traditional technology, scientists do not observe a set of methodological rules, as philosophers
have claimed. Instead, scientific activities are influenced by socio?historical circumstances, just as
in technological activities. Any distinction between what it is done in science and what it is done in
technology is based on an idea taken for granted: that science is only related to the production of
knowledge, especially theories. Nonetheless, science is involved in the development of instruments
and sets of practices. Whether some kind of distinction could be established between science and
technology, it would be to consider them as two different and socially built cultures; but this does
not mean that any real division exists. Some sociologists, e.g., Hughes and Callon, go further when
they claim that technology, science and the economy are a seamless web (see Hughes, 1988); or a
system in which all elements are constructed, with no limits between them.
The main difficulty with this perspective is its exclusive sociological point of view, in which it is
difficult to find differences between science and technology, because the perspective only focuses
on social similarities. Philosophers of technology have no problem accepting that technological
artifacts, as scientific theories, are the result of human actions. However, it could be useful to
differentiate the objectives of the two communities. The main goal of scientists is to increase the
state of knowledge, and the main goal of technologists is the improvement of an artifact or the
invention of a new one. This statement does not mean that in achieving these objectives other sub?
objectives cannot be involved —practical sub?objectives in science and epistemic sub?objectives in
technology. The principal aim in both cases, however, decides the structure of science and
technology, their separate knowledge, activities, and practitioners.
Another widespread commonplace within the non?differentiation perspective is a focus on “know
how” in science, the most characteristic aspect of technological knowledge. This idea, however, is
not appropriate in accounting for the existence of a science?technology system; it rests on the
confusion between “know how” and technological knowledge. As a matter of fact, there are kinds
of knowledge involved in technology others than “know how.”4 The argument of a continuous
science?technology complex based on the use by scientists of know-how is not suitable.
Technologists use every kind of knowledge, and the same could be said for scientists. The
differences between them, as it will be shown in this paper, lie in part in their objectives. When a
community has the goal of knowing the age of the universe, it develops activities and sets of
knowledge different from another community which tries to build a long and strong bridge. Of
course, the first community needs a powerful telescope built by technologists. Similarly, the
technological community could need some knowledge developed by scientists about hydrology or
physics. The reason for these connections is not that they are the same system, though they are
related systems. Sociological, or even epistemic similarities, are not enough to prove a continuum
because there are important differences among these communities, especially the objectives
scientists and technologists try to achieve.
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Nowadays, there are some mixed communities, where scientists and technologists collaborate on
special projects. Michael Gibbons (1994) describes two different ways to create knowledge: one is
more traditional, where problems are solved in an interest-directed context. Some of the interests
are academic, related to a specialized community, hierarchically organized, and the principal aim is
to obtain cognitive outcomes. The other way of doing science is carried out in an application
context, with different scientists and technologists collaborating and joined together temporarily
with the aim of obtaining useful outcomes. This explanation is useful for these new mixed projects,
even though the scientists and technologists who work together have different objectives. In
addition to traditional ways of doing science and technology there is this new one. However, this
does not mean that the traditional ways are no longer useful; it is still possible to find “pure”
scientific and technological projects.
3. The relationships between science and technology in a new light.
The absence of a consensus among the different characterizations of the science?technology
relationship could drive us to despair. Perhaps their relationships are so complex that it is
impossible to achieve consensus. However, we should not give up on the aim. It is possible to
consider all the attempts to be partial characterizations. That is to say, most of them propose some
kind of existing relationships. The problem is that each of these perspectives considers one
explanation as the only possible relationship. It is true, for example, that some technological
developments would not have been possible without some previous scientific discoveries. In the
same way, technological infrastructures are determinant of modern science —so there are symbiotic
relationships between them. Nonetheless, a new understanding of science and technology
relationships has to take into account a deeper view of the complex systems that science and
technology are.
3. 1. A more complex characterization of science and technology.
Science, in general, can be described as a complex system of actions and agents, whose general
objective is the production of models in order to represent the reality, in the same vein as Ronald
Giere has propounded (Giere, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002, forthcoming (1), and
forthcoming (2)). At the same time, it is reasonable to defend that technology is a complex system
of actions performed by human agents whose final objective is to build an artifact or a technological
process. In both cases, several activities are displayed, and different objectives and kinds of
knowledge5 are involved.
Giere’s view is commonly framed in the so-called “semantic view of theories”, in which other well
known philosophers such as Patrick Suppes, Frederick Suppe, and Bas van Fraasen have made
important contributions (for a historical review: Frederick Suppe, 1989). The semantic view was
conceived as an alternative to the “syntactic approach” of the received view. Instead of sets of true
propositions about the world, theories are now better understood as sets or clusters of models. It is
generally considered that the relationship between models and the world must be an isomorphic one.
Nevertheless, Giere considers more accurately to say that the relations between models and the
world are similarity relationships. There are no true theories but catalogues of cases in which
models “fit” well enough with systems of the world (Giere, 1988, p. 92). These models are
generated by scientists using general principles and specific conditions (Giere, 2003, p. 5). General
principles —which in other perspectives are scientific laws— are not universal truths, but at best
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truths consensually agreed by scientists for a specific model or cluster of models.6 The degree of
similarity will depend on pragmatic issues and not just on ontological and epistemological ones.
Considering general principles from pragmatical, as well as ontological and epistemological
perspectives, it supports Giere’s realistic constructive perspective. Giere has pointed out (Giere,
1999b) that it is possible to distinguish between different types of representational models: (i)
material models, which include maps, diagrams, and scale models; (ii) abstract models, such as
pure mathematical models, applied mathematical models, and theoretical models built with
theoretical principles (such as Newton’s laws, Schroedinger’s equation for quantum mechanics,
Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and Mendel’s laws of genetics).
Another interesting feature of Giere’s realism is the incorporation of some constructivist elements
generally considered contrary to the traditional realism. He maintains that science is made by
human beings: scientists. They are intentional agents, and use models in order to represent some
aspects of the world with determined purposes. From the very beginning some values are involved
in the election of the best model, the most important being to choose a model that provides the most
accurate potential representation. The scientific community will help to reach a consensus regarding
validity of reasons.7
Nevertheless, Giere’s approach does not imply any relativism from the ontological point of view.
Scientists choose those aspects of phenomena they are going to deal with, that is to say, the
properties they consider relevant to their purposes, while ignoring others (Giere, 1999, p. 180). This
is not to say that scientists “invent” reality, the position which a more radical constructivist could
defend, but rather that the world is complex enough so as to admit different models about the same
phenomena without necessarily implying that one of them has to be the right one.8 It all depends on
the purposes for which the models are devised.
Technological activities have not been so well described as scientific activities, nor they have
received the same amount of philosophical efforts. As a result, the consideration of technology as a
set of artifacts is now a widespread definition. Of course, technological artifacts are a very
important element of the complex system, but not the only one. These artifacts are possible because
some agents carried out different activities. Researching, designing, and manufacturing could be an
attempt for categorizing the three main types, although within these sets more specialized activities
are developed. During manufacturing processes, technologists construct real artifacts with the use of
tools and machinery. In the designing phase, technologists are involved in the process of creating a
new device or some improvement on an old one. Likewise, within the designing processes there are
different sub?activities9 .
3. 2. The engineering sciences.
In addition to those activities, there is another technological activity which needs to be defended
against the point of view of those who think that the most sophisticated technological knowledge
comes from scientific research. More than a few authors, among whom are Mario Bunge (Bunge,
1966, 1967), Edwin Layton (Layton, 1971, 1974, 1976b, 1979, 1988), Ladislav Tondl (Tondl,
1973), Joseph Agassi (Agassi, 1980, 1985), Fredrich Rapp (Rapp, 1981), Walter Vincenti (Vincenti,
1990, 2001), and Ilkaa Niiniluoto (Niiniluoto, 1995)10 , suggested that technologists themselves are
able to develop theoretical knowledge. All of these authors distinguished a group of sciences not
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/cuevas.html[9/18/2009 5:06:37 PM]
included in the more habitual classifications, and agreed these special sciences share a good deal of
features. As sciences, they require experimental research and mathematical language (Rapp); they
deal with the same laws of nature as the rest of sciences (Bunge, Rapp, and Vincenti); they are both
descriptive (Rapp and Niiniluoto) and predictive (Rapp and Bunge); their outcomes are shared and
taught in similar ways of communication and training as the other sciences have been (Layton and
Vincenti); they are a result of the division of labor (Tondl, Layton, and Vincenti); and the
development of their knowledge is accumulative (Layton and Vincenti11 ). In spite of many
discrepancies among these authors, all of them agreed on this: the practical goal that directs these
sciences is what makes them different from the others. Engineering scientists work with the aim of
solving engineering problems and helping during the production of artifacts (while current scientists
build up their theories so as to get a better comprehension of observable phenomena).
These contributions made it possible to question the simplistic idea that all theoretical knowledge
comes from natural sciences and then is applied to technology. Obviously, this idea is still widely
accepted.12 For instance, in the cases of Bunge and Rapp, there still remains the tendency to
consider this knowledge the result of certain processes of transformation (never adequately
explained13 ) of previous knowledge developed by natural scientists. This tendency is derived from
the privileged relationship some philosophers consider to exist between scientific knowledge and
reality: scientific theories provide accurate knowledge about the world (realism), and the artifacts
created based on that knowledge supposedly validates this thesis.14
This idea is only partially correct. First, it is not plausible that all natural scientific theories must be
applied in order to design a technological device. Second, in order to explain the highly
sophisticated knowledge involved in designing and manufacturing technological artifacts, certain
scientific theories are necessary. However, in many cases current scientific theories cannot
adequately solve every problem emerging during technological processes, and technologists
themselves must face up to the task of developing their own theoretical knowledge. Artifacts
manufactured through such a process work effectively, though with limitations.
Engineering sciences, as the other sciences, can be analyzed with resources provided by Ronald
Giere’s constructive realism. However, in the case of engineering sciences, Giere’s constructive
realism may be interpreted as having instrumentalist characteristics. This claim may be
controversial, because some philosophers tend to think of instrumentalism as a kind of relativism
(non compatible with realism). Nevertheless, this is not the case, at least for engineering sciences.
Whether something works in the world effectively is not a relative matter, nor to choose the most
adequate model for achieving that goal.
Strength of materials can be a good example of one of these engineering sciences. This theory
provides models about the relationships between external loads applied to a body and effects of the
loads in the internal structure of that body. The engineers who develop this theory produce those
models on the basis of general principles, as the Hooke’s law or the Saint Venant’s principle. These
engineers abstract and idealize different characteristics of bodies interesting for the purposes of the
theory. For instance, properties of homogeneity, isotropy, continuity of the matter or elasticity are
assumed in strength of materials. From the point of view of other related sciences, as theoretical
mechanics, those properties are false. The traditional explanation about scientific theories would say
that these assumptions are false, since in more consolidated theories (such as Physics) matter has
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quite different properties (matter is neither homogeneous nor continuous, and just is isotropic in
some cases). In contrast, from the perspective of model based and representational theories, it is
possible to say that strength of materials proposes representational models about some systems of
the world, and that systems can be considered to bear the properties of homogeneity, continuity, and
isomorphism. That is to say, different purposes can bring about the generation of different models.
Margaret Morrison (Morrison, 1999) and Paul Teller (Teller, 2001) have studied the case of water:
how water can be considered to be either a collection of molecules (when the diffusion of a drop of
ink in a glass of water is analyzed); or a fluid (if the objective is the characterization of the behavior
of water circulating in pipes). In other words, there can be multiple models dealing with the same
phenomena, if those models deal with different properties of phenomena, and the purposes for
analyzing are also different. Reality is too complex to be grasped with only one theory (for instance
Giere, 1999, p. 180). Theories are sets of models that search for characterizations or explanations of
the behavior of some systems, that are nothing but partial aspects of reality. In this sense, strength
of materials is doing nothing different. The only difference has to do with the purposes aiming the
research.15 In this way, the most similar models for the scientists-engineers are those models that
allow to build, in the most efficient way, an artifact. From the point of view of other scientific
theories, such as Newtonian mechanics, the conclusions achieved by strength of materials can be
false, but from the point of view of the purposes of the engineers who develop and use strength of
materials theory, these conclusions are satisfactory enough. If the main objective in natural sciences
is “to know how the things are”, for engineering sciences, as strength of materials, it is necessary to
add another objective: “in order to make other things work”.
Technological knowledge can be limited neither to know-how or skills, nor to the application of
natural scientific theories. Sometimes, the most developed formal, natural, or social sciences cannot
supply the necessary knowledge for some technological problems. In such a case, technologists can
develop their own theoretical knowledge.
It is obvious that these engineering sciences are going to play an important role in the
characterization of science-technology relationships. As any other scientific development,
engineering sciences could influence and be influenced by other sciences. Moreover, the model
based perspective about sciences allows a better comprehension of different roles that technological
artifacts may play in their relation with scientific development.
Given these reconsiderations of science and technology, the time has come to introduce a wider
explanation about the relationships between scientific and technological systems.
3. 3. How many relationships?
This papers defends the idea that science is a complex system for producing representational models
(in the general sense of models), and that technology is a complex system for producing artifacts.
Nevertheless, the production of scientific representational models is a process that requires different
activities. On the other hand, technologists need some theoretical models that can sometimes be
developed by themselves, in order to achieve their goal. Consequently, the elements that are going
to be part of the relationships between science and technology are, fundamentally, models. These
models can be physical models or theoretical. If we uphold the stated definitions about science and
technology, then the physical models are the outcome of a technological process, and the theoretical
models are the result of a scientific process. With this distinction in mind, it is possible to identify
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six kinds of relationships:
To explain and exemplify all these relationships:
(1) Scientists often use technological artifacts as replicas, scale models and analogue machines16 .
Some of these artifacts are used as exemplars, i.e., machines that can be used for explaining an
excessively complex idea. An orrery, or any of the instruments that are nowadays in the science
museums, is a good instance. These technological artifacts are very useful in the experience of
learning and spreading scientific concepts, otherwise difficult or obscure. In this case, the
relationship between technological artifacts and scientific theories is exemplary.17
(2) Scientists need to use different technological artifacts in the course of performing their work.
They need precise artifacts for measuring, experimenting, and observing. These artifacts are made
by technologists, and can be considered to be part of technological systems, in the same way as Pitt
has propounded. This kind of technological artifacts are sometimes created on the basis of older
technological artifacts, which had a different purpose. For instance, before the invention of the
telescope, there were lenses used for correcting some defects in eyesight. When Hans Lippershey, a
manufacturer of eyeglasses, built the first telescope in 1608 he did not revolutionize the science of
his time. One year later, Galileo did, when he found a new utility for the device. Another example
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that illustrates this point is the relationship between chaos theory and computers. Chaos theory was
developed out of what computers made possible in mathematics and physics. Nowadays, most
technological artifacts used during scientific work are built by technologists following specifications
from scientists. In this sense, the way of doing science in laboratories involves the work of
technologists. Despite the fact that these devices are used by scientists, we must not forget that they
still are technological artifacts created by technologists using special knowledge and skills. In this
case, the relationship between science and technology is instrumental and the function of the
technological artifacts is integrated into the scientific activity.
(3) Another relationship between scientific models and technological artifacts arises when a
technological artifact inspires the development of a new scientific explanation. The most famous
example here is the steam engine and thermodynamics. In this kind of case, the artifact is not
instrumental, but rather an artifact that works even without a good explanation suggested by any
scientific theory. When Sadi Carnot later made his proposal, he was trying to give a scientific
explanation of the processes that occur inside a steam engine. Instead of explaining the behavior of
only one machine, his theory was intended to be useful for any machine or similar process. Lord
Kelvin substituted the caloric theory, the most accepted view at that time, for thermodynamics when
he made Sadi Carnot’s results compatible with Joule’s conclusions about energy. These
relationships have been very common in the history of science. Actually, some historians (as Paolo
Rossi in 1970) have suggested that all of modern science in the seventeen century was originated in
a similar process. We call this the first kind of heuristic relationships.
(4) The physical models can have also another heuristic purpose. Sometimes it can be very difficult,
or even impossible, to analyze directly the properties of a system. In those cases, the simplest
method for researching the properties of the real system may be to build a replica or an analogue.
The Lorenzian waterwheel and its relationships with chaos theory is a good example of this kind of
interaction. Between analogue models of this kind and real systems there is a second kind of
heuristic relationship.
(5) It is possible to consider another kind of relationship between scientific models and technology:
when a new scientific theory creates new technological possibilities. These relationships are
explained in the linear model, above. Technology applies those theories developed by sciences in
the production of new artifacts. However, the process of application is not simple.
First, the recognition by a technologist of some interesting or useful scientific knowledge is
necessary. It is important to point out that the theoretical models provided by scientists are usually
far away from practical technological problems. During the construction of these models, scientists
need to: (a) compose and decompose, (b) weight or emphasize, (c) order, (d) delete and supplement,
and (e) deform reality.18 Scientists apply these procedures for the sake of research. This theoretical
aim is the main reason why scientific theoretical models cannot be directly applied to solve
technological problems, and the possibilities of applying directly these idealized and abstract models
to technological problems are limited. General and abstract models provided by scientists contain
general principles that have to be transformed into more particular principles. When some general
principles coming from theoretical models are used by technologists, they need to add some margin
of error, more precise examples, or more accurate physical models. The model as a whole cannot be
applied to solve technological problems.19
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During this “specification process,” the relation between the general model provided by
conventional sciences, and the new model in engineering sciences, is not a mere process of
application. It is necessary to develop new research in order to obtain a technological-theoretical
model. Nathan Rosenberg and Richard Nelson (1994) have analyzed the example of chemical
engineering. They have pointed out that knowledge provided by chemistry is not enough to develop
industrial chemical processes. In order to generate new products on an industrial scale, engineering
processes are necessary. Some of the general principles from the chemistry models can be used in
the models required for industrial production, but the models are not the same. The new
technological-theoretical models provide an interpretation of reality (an epistemological goal), but
these models have also to answer to design questions (a practical objective). Some well known
examples are those suggested by Bunge about fluid mechanics and the theory of flight (Bunge,
1966, p. 338).20
(6) To end, there is another relationship between science and technology that is not commonly
recognized. In the reverse way, technologists may use some elements from formal, natural, and
social sciences theoretical models for producing technological-theoretical models. These models in
the realm of engineering science have the same function as models in the generation of the formal,
natural or social sciences.
One example that can illustrate this relationship is the connection some theoretical ideas from
between strength of materials and explanations using the luminiferous ether. The ether theory was
suggested to explain the deformative behavior of light waves. If there is a material substrate in
which light can move, planets and stars can also move in the same material. However, to accept
this idea led to problems in the explanation of the movements of these bodies in space. If there is
such a material, then it has to slow down planetary and stars movements, but this is not the case.
For these reasons, some scientists during the nineteen century used other ideas from strength of
materials, namely elasticity. James McCullagh proposed a rotational elastic medium, and Cauchy
propounded an unusual property for the ether: negative compression. George Gabriel Stokes in his
work On the Dynamical Theory of Diffraction (Mathematical and Physical Papers, Vol. 1, 1845)
considered the ether as a non-crystal and elastic medium, or in other words, an elastic solid, a
property of matter explained in strength of materials.
A more current instance is the development of the computer and its influence in the cognitive
sciences. This example is different than others considered before in (3) and (4). During World War
II computers were developed as general machines to process symbols. Some scientists, as Allen
Newell and Herbert A. Simon (1957), Noam Chomsky (1957) and George A. Miller, Eugene
Galanter and Karl H. Pribram (1960) did not agree with the behaviorist’s perspective and put
forward a new approach: an information-processing model of psychology. They realized that
computers could help in the understanding of human thought processes. Like the computer, humans
take in information (from the senses), process it, and produce an output.21 In the computer case, the
hardware is the physical machine and the software is the programs that run on it. In the human case,
the hardware is the brain and the software is the mental processes. When perceiving, people are
parallel processors encoding different information, and when thinking, people are serial processors,
who do one thing after another. As Herbert Simon has maintained: “If you test your programs not
merely by what they can accomplish, but how they accomplish it, then you are really doing
cognitive science; you are using AI to understand the human mind”. Some of them even said, it is
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possible to predict the behavior of one person if we know: (i) the goal that the person is striving
towards, (ii) the internal representation of a problem, and (iii) the invariant mechanism, i.e.
hardware (memory, capacity, speed of processing etc.). Therefore, those models provided by
computer sciences were (and are) useful in the development of theoretical models about human
psychology.
The last example of how engineering models can generate new models in other sciences is the case
of robotics. Ulrich Nehmzow, a professor in the Department of Computer Science in the University
of Manchester, and one of the most important experts in robotics nowadays, has suggested that it is
necessary to apply “quantitative methods in mobile robotics, in order to change the discipline from
an empirical one to a more precise science” (Nehmzow, 2001, p. 1, see also Nehmzow 2003).
Mobile robotics in the present day provides models for the behavior of robots in a very
particularized way. There is no general explanation, no general model that recounts the common
characteristics that robots have to fulfill. The new models fall somewhere between natural sciences
and social sciences. Some aspects of the robot’s activity (speed, acceleration, or the characteristics
of electronic circuits) can be measured quantitatively, but other aspects of the robot behavior are
characterized by qualitative descriptions. We will see in future years the development of this new
theory.
4. Conclusions
This paper has tried to show the different explanations propounded by philosophers, historians,
sociologists, and economists, about the possible relationships between science and technology. All
these positions have some virtues, but most of them exclude other equally valid possibilities. Here
it has been suggested that this problem could be fixed with a less restricted definition of science and
technology. The new definitions are based on the constructive realism of Giere. For him, scientists
are devoted to the production of representational models which fit real systems in different degrees.
However, the restricted idea of technology as a set of artifacts is not accurate. Technology is not
only artifacts, it implies the work of different technologists and different kinds of knowledge. In
addition, technologists do not merely apply scientific theories for technological solutions. Engineers
can develop their own theoretical models about real systems. Those models are, in important senses,
different from the theoretical models offered in other sciences. These differences are due to their
respective main objectives. In the case of traditional sciences, the main goal is to provide general
and correct models of some real systems. These systems and models have to be similar. In the case
of technological theoretical models, the main goal is to offer models that help in the solution of
problems that arise when designing and manufacturing artifacts. The relationship between the
models and the real systems is also a similarity relation, but the degree of similarity depends on the
efficiency of these models. Even when technologists use models which come from formal, natural
or social sciences, they need to introduce some changes in the models in order to use them.
With this new characterization of science and technology, a fresh perspective about the relationships
between these two fields has been suggested. It is possible to distinguish, at least, between six
different kinds of relationships. Technological artifacts may be exemplar models for other sciences.
In other cases, technological artifacts are instruments for the development of scientific activities. In
addition, technological artifacts can have two heuristic functions for scientific development of
models: as inspirations for new scientific explanations, or as models that help in seeking new
properties of reality. Furthermore, parts of theoretical models coming from formal, natural or social
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sciences can be used (with some prior changes) in the solution of technological problems. Similarly,
some technological theoretical models can have an analogous effect within formal, natural or social
sciences.
This new description of the relations between different kinds of models implies a new perspective
about sciences. The standard idea of the unity of science maintains that “the laws and concepts of
every scientific domain (psychology, sociology, economics, history, biology, chemistry) are
reducible to those of a more fundamental domain, all arranged in a hierarchy, till we reach physics
at the pinnacle”.22 This characterization is not valid any more. Instead, if we accept the definition of
scientific theories as families or clusters of models, then it is possible to describe the relations
between different scientific disciplines as sharing some models or fundamental principles.
Sometimes, the relationship is not of sharing models, but of finding inspiration for new
explanations in one scientific area that come from another area.23 Given these considerations, it is
not surprising that the characterization maintained by supporters of these traditional views of
science and technology could be described as excessively simplistic. Science and technology are
made by human beings and, on some occasions, to distinguish between them is far from easy.
Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate between them on the basis of the different purposes that
scientists and engineers can have during the development of their activities. Scientists’ main purpose
is “to know how things are”, whereas engineers’ main purpose is “to build an effective artifact”.
All the different relationships suggest, as well, another conclusion. If the idea of technology as
applied science is too narrow, and there are other relationships between science and technology (in
both directions), then it is necessary to reconsider the justifications for investments in basic
research. There is no guarantee that large investments in an area will produce practical benefits.
Sometimes, technological opportunities are more side effects than applications of scientific
knowledge. The deterministic perspective, that connects scientific research with technological
development, is no longer valid. Harmful technologies can also be consequence of scientific
advancement. Saying this does not imply the Dr. Frankenstein myth, however. In our modern
societies, technologists sometimes cause misfortune but often also create success. We need to be
more certain about the of nature of our technologies if the effects of their development on society or
on the environment will be irreversible.**
Ana Cuevas
University of Delaware
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1. It is possible to distinguish several approaches considered as constructivism. In the first place,
we find the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), originally put forward by Wiebe E. Bijker ,
Thomas P. Huges and Trevor Pinch (1987). Related with this is the work of H. M. Collins (1985)
and Steve Woolgar (1991). The constructivism also includes the “social shaping” approach of
Donald MacKenzie (1990) and the actor-network approach of Bruno Latour (1987), Michael Callon
(1986, 1992), and John Law (1986).
2. For a very good explanations about the relevance of the Constructivist point of view for the
philosophy of technology see: Woolgar (1991); Radder (1992); Brey (1997).
3. Bruno Latour, Michael Callon, and John Law are the main authors in this group.
4. If we take into account the following schema (see Quintanilla, 1996), we will have four kinds of
knowledge, and each one is found in technology.
                 Representational                 Operational
Explicit       Know that                         Know how
Tacit          Intuition                            Skill
5. See quotation number 4.
6. He deliberately says that the natural laws are not universal, nor necessaries, nor truth. (Giere,
1999, p. 90).
7. These ideas derive from pragmatism (Ronald Giere, 1999, p. 75). In philosophy of technology we
could find something similar in (Joseph Pitt, 2000, p. 4).
8. He agrees with Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright, 1983, p. 11), “No single model serves all purposes
best.” (Also in p. 104 and 152).
“Imagine the universe as having a definite structure, but exceedingly complex, so complex that no
models humans can devise could ever capture more than limited aspects of the total complexity.
Nevertheless, some ways of constructing models of the world do provide resources for capturing
some aspects of the world more or less well. Other ways may provide resources for capturing some
aspects more or less well. Both ways, however, may capture some aspects of the reality and thus be
candidates for a realistic understanding of the world. So here, in principle, is a solution to the
problem of finding a picture of science that is both naturalistic and realistic.” (Giere, 1999, p. 79).
9. First, to verify needs, either pulled by demand or pushed by the particular technology itself.
Second, to analyze the requisites of the artifact and the available means within the firm. Third, to
think up different solutions and choose the most adequate one. Fourth, to put to the test these
different alternatives, then choose one and build a prototype. This prototype will be the base for
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touching up possible mistakes before the definitive blueprint. Lastly, it is necessary to organize the
manufacturing process.
10. We also could include here T. Kortabinski, H. Rumpf, G. Ropohl and others, but the cited
authors are representative of the main ideas on the subject.
11. See Edward Constant (1980).
12. For instance, (Pitt, 2000, p. 9) says: “It is necessary to rethink the old assumption that
technology is merely applied science and, as such, applied knowledge. This is not to deny the fact
that from certain scientific discoveries we have been able to produce devices that make life easier.
That is, some technologies are the result of applying the knowledge that science produces.” (The
italics are mine).
13. For instance, Hans Radder says: “Much hard work is needed to transform a successfully
realized scientific result and to incorporate it into a working technological system.” (Radder, 1996,
p. 145). However, he does not make a deeper account of this “hard work”.
14. Just to mention a classic: “Science as an institutionalized art of inquiry has yielded varied fruit.
Its currently best-published products are undoubtedly the technological skills that have been
transforming traditional forms of human economy at an accelerating rate.” (Ernest Nagel, 1961, p.
vii). In the same vein we could see too the “miracle argument” by John J. C. Smart (1963) and
Hilary Putnam (1975).
A more recent contribution is Radder’s view: “Concerning experimental natural science as such, I
think two legitimations play a fairly prominent and general role. The first is the claim that science is
valuable because it delivers the truth about nature or, at least, promises to eventually give a true
account of nature. The second major social legitimations is framed in the claim that experimental
science is practically useful, that its results can often be fruitfully incorporated into all kinds of
technological projects. (…) Actually, in present-day society, the “technological” legitimations
seems to be the most influential.” (Radder, 1996, p. 40).
15. This idea is suggested by R. Giere, Margaret Morrison, and Paul Teller, although neither of
them apply it to the case of engineering sciences.
16. Mary Hesse proposed this classification long time ago, in 1963. Nevertheless, it still remains
useful for the purposes of this paper.
17. For some scientists is an habitual practice. Lord Kelvin said "I am never content until I have
constructed a mechanical model of the subject I am studying. If I succeed in making one, I
understand; otherwise I do not."
18. As Nelson Goodman (1978) has pointed out. This article does not uphold the ontological
implications of Goodman’s view. Nevertheless, his characterization of the different actions that
scientists may do during their work is very inspired.
19. “The margins of error rarely appear in the descriptions or calculations until one gets to the point
of comparing theoretical predictions with actual measurements. This practice strongly supports
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interpreting the original equations without explicit margins of error, as referring not to actual things
but to abstract models of which they are true by definition” (Giere, 1999b, p. 6).
20. This example has been analyzed by Walter Vincenty in (2001). There he studies the case of a
general theory: “The theory of supersonic wing” by Allen Puckett and how this theory had to be
corrected by engineers for being applicable to real cases.
21. An Information Processing System has a processor, memory (short-term and long term),
receptors and effectors.
22. Cartwright (1999), p. 6.
23. In a similar way, Cartwright (1999) following Neurath’s theory.
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